A New Restriction on an Exception to the Hearsay Rule by Olson, Ronald K.
Tulsa Law Review 
Volume 6 Issue 2 
1970 
A New Restriction on an Exception to the Hearsay Rule 
Ronald K. Olson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ronald K. Olson, A New Restriction on an Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 6 Tulsa L. J. 182 (2013). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol6/iss2/7 
This Casenote/Comment is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For more 
information, please contact megan-donald@utulsa.edu. 
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
But the Gibbons decision brings in focus once again the rule
that in custody proceedings paramount concern should al-
ways be: What is in the best interests of the child.
William D. Nay
EVIDENCE-A New Restriction On An Exception
To The Hearsay Rule
In Barber v. Page' testimony which incriminated the peti-
tioner, Barber, was given at a preliminary hearing by a co-
defendant, Woods. When the petitioner was brought to trial,
the transcript made at the preliminary hearing was offered
in evidence rather than the testimony of Woods himself who
was in a federal penitentiary in Texas. The admission of the
transcript by the trial court was objected to by the defendant
as a violation of his right to confrontation guaranteed by
the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution.2 The
objection was overruled; petitioner was convicted in the trial
court, and on appeal his conviction was affirmed.3 The United
States Supreme Court reversed and held that a witness is
not "unavailable" for the purpose of allowing the admission
into evidence the transcript of his testimony, ". . . unless the
prosecutorial authorities have made a good faith effort to ob-
tain his presence at trial. '4
Testimony given at a former proceeding and later offered
at a trial in transcribed form as an evidentiary substitute
for the actual presence of that witness has been most fre-
quently characterized, ". . . as an exception to the hearsay
child rather than awarding custody to the mother simply
because she was the mother.
390 U.S. 719 (1968).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
8 Barber v. State, 388 P.2d 320 (Okla. Crim. 1963).
4 Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968).
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EVIDENCE
prohibition .. -. "5 This exception is a product of necessity
and is allowed only upon a sufficient showing of the unavail-
ability of the witness.6 The obvious unavailability of a deceas-
ed witness has caused the Supreme Court to recognize the ad-
missibility of dying declarations 7 and testimony from a former
trial given by a witness who died prior to the second trial.8
Unavailability has also been recognized as having been es-
tablished when the accused has procured the absence of the
witness.9 However, in Motes v. United States the court held
that where unavailability was occasioned by the negligence
of the prosecutor, in that the witness who was in the court-
house within an hour of the time he was to testify simply dis-
appeared, the testimony transcribed at a preliminary hearing
was not admissible since it was "not within any of the rec-
ognized exceptions to the general rule prescribed in the Con-
stitution."' 0
In Pointer v. Texas" the state introduced into evidence
the transcript of testimony which had been given at a pre-
liminary hearing. This was necessitated by the fact that Phil-
lips, the key witness, had moved to California and "... . did
not intend to return to Texas .... ,u2 Unavailability was there-
fore the basis upon which the state sought to achieve admis-
sion under the exception to the hearsay rule. This was con-
sistent with the generally accepted doctrine that unavaila-
bility is sufficiently shown by proving that the witness is
5 McCoRMcK, EVIDENCE § 230 (1954).
6 Id. § 231.
7 Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892). See also Carver
v. United States, 164 U.S. 694 (1897). In Carver the Court
points out that although dying declarations clearly are ad-
missible as exceptions to the hearsay rule, they may also
be impeached.
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
9 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).10 178 U.S. 458, 474 (1900).
1 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
-2 Id. at 401.
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"out of the jurisdiction."13 Although the Pointer holding denied
the use of the transcript the ruling was based on the absence
of a cross-examination of the witness and arguably lack of
counsel at the preliminary hearing, and not on the unavail-
ability of the witness at the trial. Indeed, the Court strongly
implied that it would not raise any barrier to hearsay evi-
dence of this type absent any denial of the rights of the ac-
cused. 14
In applying ... the confrontation guarantee of the Sixth
Amendment. . ."15 to the states, the Court citing from Malloy
v. Hogan16 held that the federal standard for confrontation
would be applied to the states.'7 This new "doctrine of uncer-
tain reach"'8 must, therefore, be evaluated in terms of its im-
pact on existing standards in the individual jurisdictions.
Oklahoma's requirements concerning unavailability as a
requisite to the admission of former testimony was first set
forth in Jeffries v. State.19 To qualify as an exception to the
hearsay rule, the absent witness whose testimony is at issue
must be dead, insane, sick, out of the state, or it must be
shown that ".... their whereabouts cannot with due diligence
11 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §1404 (3d ed. 1940). In §1404 (b) Wig-
more notes, "To persuade the witness' voluntary attendance"
is a meritorious endeavor but contends "it is unnecessary
to prescribe this as a general rule." See also, MCCORMICK,
EVIDENCE §234 (1954).
14 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407 (1965).
15 Id. at 406.
16 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
'7 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965).
18 75 YALE L.J. 1434 (1966). This note suggests that the con-
frontation requirement be interpreted as a "canon of prose-
cutorial behavior." Id. at 1439. See also 19 U. MIAmi L. REV.
500 (1965).
'9 13 Okla. Crim. 146, 162 P. 1137 (1917); accord, Fitzsimmons
v. State, 14 Okla. Crim. 80, 166 P. 453 (1917).
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be ascertained .... ,20 In deciding whether a witness is un-
available for the purpose of allowing the introduction of
former testimony, the court is vested with a wide discretion.21
Abuse of this discretion and severe stretching of the excep-
tion is illustrated by Jolliffee v. State22 where it was held that
a witness in custody of Kansas authorities was unavailable
and that it was not incumbent upon the prosecutor to in-
stitute proceedings to have him returned. The case is con-
sistent, however, with the general willingness of the Okla-
homa courts to classify as unavailable any witness who has
left the state and shows no inclination to return.2 The basis
for the admission of testimony given by an absent witness is
still geared to a standard of unavailability which was cor-
rectly described in Fletcher v. State where the court observed
that the "rule is based upon circumstances of necessity and
the transcript . . . shall be excluded in all cases where the
witness can be produced in person. '24
The Supreme Court in Barber v. Page took the position
that the Oklahoma prosecutor did not present a sufficient
showing of unavailability.25 The Court acknowledged that the
exception to the hearsay rule was a product of necessity, and
it was this aspect of the exception that the Court stressed
as it pointed out that after it was ascertained that the wit-
ness was in a federal penitentiary in another state, "The State
made absolutely no effort to obtain the presence of Woods
at trial ... .,"26 The Court went on to aim directly at the long-
20 Valentine v. State, 16 Okla. Crim. 76, 194 P. 254, 161 (1919),
quoting from Warren v. State, 6 Okla. Crim. 1, 115 P. 812
(1911); accord, Hamilton v. State, 95 Okla. Crim. 262, 244
P.2d 328 (1952). Here the court calls for a strict observance
of the rule in admitting this type of evidence.21 Pittman v. State, 272 P.2d 458 (Okla. Crim. 1954).
22 21 Okla. Crim. 278, 207 P. 454 (1922).
2 Supra, notes 19, 20.
24 364 P.2d 713, 715 (Okla. Crim. 1961).
25 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
26 Id. at 723.
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held concept that ". . . mere absence of a witness from the
jurisdiction was sufficient ground for dispensing with con-
frontation .... 27 The Court held that a witness who is sim-
ply absent from the jurisdiction is not "unavailable" for the
purpose of invoking the exception and prosecutors must not
merely try but must make a "good-faith" effort to bring the
witness to the courtroom for confrontation with the accused.29
Thus, under this holding, unavailability can no longer be
adequately established by showing that the witness is "out
of the jurisdiction."29
The Supreme Court was quite emphatic in its position
and specifically directed attention to existing means provid-
ed in the Federal Statutes for bringing the absent witness to
court.30 Witness in the custody of federal officials can be
sought with a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum. The
decision further implied that greater rigor must be displayed
in obtaining the presence of out of state witness not in prison.31
As a result of Barber, unavailability now has a new and
narrower dimension. One likely result will be that the in-
troduction of this type of hearsay evidence will be increasing-
ly difficult since Barber will cause a focusing of the courts'
attention on the limitation of the exception. Immediate im-
plications for Oklahoma prosecutors include the need to be-
come familiar with and become sensitive to the use of the
Uniform Act which is available to them.82
Ronald K. Olson
27 Id.
28 Id. at 725.
29 See 5 WIGmORE, EViDENCE § 1404 (3d ed. 1940).
30 Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724 (1968). The statute re-
ferred to by the court is 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (c) (5).
31 Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 723 (1968).
32 OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 721-27 (1961).
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